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Sweden has been considered both pioneer and pariah in regard to its approach to the novel 
coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and its pandemic disease, COVID-19. While much of Europe went into 
economic hibernation and rigid lockdown in the first wave of novel coronavirus infections in the spring 
of 2020, Sweden kept its borders, bars, restaurants, schools, gyms etc. open. Organised children’s 
sporting arrangements were also encouraged, on the basis that socialising and physical activity 
outweighed the risks posed by COVID-19 to children. Public transportation could still be freely used. 
Masks were not worn. This paper examines the often controversial tenets of the Swedish public health 
response to COVID-19, and how widely it has appealed to public health experts and officials in Europe 
and beyond. Debates within the country are also discussed. What it shows is that, despite rising levels 
of infection in a second wave in Europe and concessions that it might have even failed, the Swedish 
model is being adopted by stealth and admired from afar. 
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Introduction 
On February 1 2020, the Swedish government classified COVID-19 as a disease 
constituting a danger to society, thereby bringing it within the scope of communicable 
disease control measures. “The overall objective of the Government’s efforts is to 
reduce the pace of the COVID-19 virus’s spread: to ‘flatten the curve’ so that the large 
numbers of people do not become ill at the same time” (Prime Minister’s Office 
(Sweden), 2020). 
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven, embracing the principle of voluntariness over coercion 
in targeting the virus, issued warnings to citizens to minimise travel and avoid any non-
essential activities. Every individual “in Sweden needs to take individual responsibility. 
If everyone takes responsibility, we can keep the spread of the virus in check. Follow 
the authorities’ advice: if you have even the slightest symptoms, do not go to work and 
refrain from meeting other people” (Prime Minister’s Office (Sweden), 2020).  
Those aged 70 and over, deemed a traditionally vulnerable group – were told by the 
Folkhälsomyndigheten (Public Health Agency of Sweden) to be particular about their 
movements and stay at home. In such cases, public transport (buses, trams and the 
Metro), shopping in supermarkets, frequenting shops and cafes, and visiting areas of 
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congregation, should be avoided. Help for buying food, collecting prescriptions and 
running errands was recommended (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2021a). 
In the Prime Minister’s words during a televised speech, “We adults need to be exactly 
that: adults. Not spread panic or rumours. No one is alone in this crisis, but each person 
carries a heavy responsibility” (Nikel, 2020). Suggestive in these remarks were two 
considerations: personal responsibility in terms of behaviour preventing transmission 
but also responsibility in not spreading rumours about exaggerated harm. As the head 
of the Public Health Agency, Johan Carlson, explained: “The purpose of our approach 
is for people themselves to understand the need to follow the recommendations and 
guidelines that exist.” There were “no other tricks before there are available medical 
measures, primarily vaccines. The Swedish population has taken this to heart” 
(Osborne, 2020). State epidemiologist Anders Tegnell reiterated the theme in an 
interview with Nature. “The Swedish laws on communicable diseases are mostly based 
on voluntary measures. It clearly states that the citizen has the responsibility not to 
spread the disease” (Paterlini, 2020). 
Such language emphasises the cooperative nature of the response between state and 
citizen responsibility, incorporating the concept of common sense or “folkvett”. The 
emphasis upon voluntary restraint pivots upon such notions of common wisdom or 
sense, bolstered by the trust shown in the public health information being 
communicated to the populace. Central to this has been the building up of trust and 
social capital – “the ability to cooperate without written rules and extensive contracts” 
(Coleman, 1988; Helsingen et al., 2020). In light of this, expansive coercive public 
health measures including the lockdown of whole geographical areas, is not only 
considered unnecessary but a legal impossibility. According to Tegnell, quarantine 
measures could be applied on a minimal scale to small areas (schools, hotels) but not 
for large areas and spaces (Paterlini, 2020).  
Studies of health systems comparable with Sweden’s have also found high degrees of 
trust in government and health institutions in terms of how risk and hazards are 
managed. Those risks and hazards are, in turn, culturally coded in terms of their 
response. “The Swedish justification for their approach was therefore based on 
culturally relevant concerns and considerations, all informed by a Swedish perception 
of risk” (Orlowski and Goldsmith, 2020, p. 293). Sweden entered the pandemic crisis 
with what Esaiasson, Sohlberg, Ghersetti and Johansson claim to be “uniquely high 
levels of interpersonal trust and high levels of institutional trust” (Esaiasson et al, 
2020). To this could also be added the fact that the Public Health Agency and Tegnell 
initially believed the threat posed by coronavirus to be minimal and entirely 
manageable. In anonymous, web-based surveys done through Facebook of individuals 
aged 15 or older from mid-March to mid-April 2020, using the snowball method, 
researchers found distinctly high trust in the Swedish sample of 508 participants 
(Helsingen et al, 2020). (3,000 Norwegians were also surveyed.) The Norwegian 
sample showed “High trust” to 17%, but for the Swedish sample, it was 37%. Some 53% 
of Swedish participants strongly agreed that they received good information from 
health authorities, compared to 27% in Norway. 
Unlike the rest of Europe (with the exception of Belarus), the Public Health Agency 
eschewed an extreme lockdown characterised by hard isolation and large-scale 
closures of businesses and facilities (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2021b). Local sports 





were seen as necessary, healthy initiatives. Organisers of events and seminars were 
responsible for conducting a risk assessment and providing information “about good 
hand hygiene, and access to hand washing facilities for all participants.” Importance 
was placed upon social distancing as a tool of minimising transmission (Carlson, 
2020). 
Tegnell’s opposition towards national lockdowns has been consistent. “It’s really using 
a hammer to kill a fly” (Milne, 2020). In discussing lockdowns in March 2020, the chief 
epidemiologist suggested that they could only ever be kept in place “for a very limited 
amount of time before people get tired” and should be used sparingly. Closing schools 
and keeping children at home would prove societally damaging to families. Dealing 
with the pandemic involved treating it like “a marathon not a sprint”; any viable 
vaccines would only be available, if at all, after a year. National restrictions should be 
as un-onerous as possible so as to be sustainable; forced lockdowns simply “tied up 
enormous resources” (quotes in Orange, 2020a and Moody, 2020). As Tegnell 
explained in an interview with the Financial Times in September, “At the outset, we 
talked very much about sustainability, and I think that’s something we managed to 
keep to. And also be a bit resistant to quick fixes, to realise that this is not going to be 
easy” or “a short-term kind of thing, it’s not going to be fixed by one kind of measure” 
(Milne, 2020). 
Nevertheless, despite the evidently non-punitive, softer nature of the public health 
directions, Sweden’s authorities were not averse to caution. Gatherings were initially 
limited to 500; the number was then reduced to 50, a measure that has been 
consistently observed. Bars could only provide table service. Colleges and universities 
moved to a virtual format in line with recommendations issued on March 18, 2020. As 
the World Health Organisation’s Mike Ryan noted at the end of April, a false narrative 
had been perpetrated about an absence of any control measures in Sweden in 
controlling the transmission of COVID-19 (Salo, 2020). The focus in Sweden, rather, 
is on sensible, voluntary restraint, making sure that large gatherings are avoided, and, 
where people do gather (those of less than 50 are permitted), physical distancing is 
observed. 
Central to this light non-pharmacological approach is also that of developing resilience 
and resistance through herd immunity. “When most of a population is immune to an 
infectious disease, this provides indirect protection – herd immunity – to those who 
are immune to the disease by acting as a bulwark against further population infection 
surges” (Orlowski & Goldsmith, 2020, p. 292). This epidemiological policy is 
controversial within the Swedish context and beyond, not least because the PHA has 
not been clear on whether it is, in fact, approving it. The idea initially received traction 
in Britain where it was openly entertained by UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson, and 
in the Netherlands by Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte (Vogel, 2020). Such a policy 
is also marked by uncertainty as to what point herd immunity can be said to be 
achieved. As Daniel M. Altman, Daniel C. Douek and Rosemary J. Boyton have warned, 
“There is no certainty as to the immunological correlates of antiviral protection or the 
proportion of the population who must attain them, making it impossible to identify a 
point when this level of immunity has been reached” (Altman, Douek & Boyton, 2020, 
p. 1528).  
Tegnell publicly claims that it was never Sweden’s intention to pursue a “herd 
immunity” policy, though his private correspondence, notably in rationalising keeping 
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schools open, suggests otherwise (Vogel, 2020). Publicly, he opined that such a pursuit 
would be immoral as no infectious disease had ever been “fully halted by herd 
immunity without a vaccine” (Moody, 2020). But in his April interview with Nature, 
he simply assumed that all countries would eventually be seeking to reach herd 
immunity, with Sweden intent on reaching “it in a different way” (Paterlini, 2020). 
Other remarks suggest that Sweden’s resilience has been based, in part, on improved 
immunity levels. Immunity, for instance, could “put the brake” on spikes of infections 
(Milne, 2020). In April, Karin Ulrika Olofsdotter, Sweden’s ambassador to the United 
Nations, was more explicit about the policy on US National Public Radio, with specific 
reference to Stockholm’s population. “About 30 percent of people in Stockholm have 
reached a level of immunity.” Daringly, she suggested that, “We could reach herd 
immunity in the capital as early as next month” (Mai, 2020). 
The evolving picture 
The numbers of COVID-19 cases in Sweden have not been negligible. From the first 
recorded case on February 4, 2020, the total, as of March 30, 2020, came to 4,028 
(Steward, 2020). Deaths come in at 146, though a disproportionate number were 
registered in a Somali community located in less commodious quarters with extended 
families (Pancevski, 2020). Modelling used in a March 2020 study by Imperial College 
London supplied the springboard for some dire predictions. Paul Franks and Peter 
Nilsson, both epidemiologists based at Lund University, contrasted that modelling 
with the PHA’s focus on “surge requirements”. “From these simulations, it is clear that 
the Swedish government anticipates far fewer hospitalisations per 100,000 of the 
population than predicted in other countries, including Norway, Denmark and the UK” 
(Franks & Nilsson, 2020). The observations by Franks and Nilsson are filled with 
characteristic scientific caution. Using British variants suggested a higher death toll for 
Sweden, though the authorities seem to be holding to the point that most infected 
people would show no symptoms, leaving one in five requiring a stint in hospital.  
Franks even went so far as to suggest that Sweden would be facing 85,000 deaths; a 
research team of Uppsala, using the Imperial College Model, suggested 40,000 deaths 
by the start of May and possibly 100,000 by August (Flaxman et al., 2020). This rate 
was not borne out (Radio Sweden, 2020; Nelson, 2020). As of 4 May, the death toll 
stood at 2,680 – still high relatively speaking to Nordic countries but better than many 
countries in the EU.  
Despite the highest death toll of the Nordic countries, Tegnell was initially confident 
that the “strategy” has worked well, with Sweden showing a relatively flat curve of 
infection relative to Italy and Spain. “We want to slow down the epidemic until Sweden 
experiences a sort of peak, and if the peak is not too dramatic we can continue” 
(Skjeseth, 2020). Over the summer of 2020, some success was achieved in slowing the 
spread, largely because an estimated 1.5 million “self-isolated, largely the elderly and 
those in risk groups” (Bjorklund & Ewing, 2020). 
The approach did see a tale of two patterns of infection. In the period from March till 
June, the rest of Europe had seemingly benefitted from extreme to tough lockdowns in 
reducing the infection rate. In Sweden, the death rate was rising and looked to be 
approaching that of Italy. While countries such as Spain, France and the UK, and the 
European Union more collectively had flattened the curve over June and July, 





leading the New York Times to call Sweden “a pariah state” (Erdbrink, 2020a). The 
death rate in aged homes proved horrendous despite Tegnell’s age segregation strategy 
and made the populist Sweden Democrats demand Tegnell’s resignation. But the 
number of case infections began to fall. In August 2020, David Goldsmith declared the 
Swedish policy a failure: the prediction by the PHA that 40% of Stockholm’s population 
would acquire the disease and duly generate sufficient antibodies had not come to pass. 
The number was closer to 15%. A warning was duly noted: “We in the UK would do 
well to remember we nearly trod the same path as Sweden, as herd immunity was often 
discussed here in early March” (Royal Society of Medicine, 2020).  
By the start of September, the pattern had seemingly been reversed. The EU was 
battling a resurgence of numbers. Countries debated how to cope with rising infections 
without re-imposing lockdowns. Papers such the Expressen gloated that the Swedish 
approach had worked. Tegnell was proud, even with the rise of infections in October, 
that citizens had made appropriate adjustments in the name of the sustainable policy. 
“Swedes have changed their behaviour more markedly than almost any other 
Europeans. We are travelling less than [people in] neighbouring countries. During the 
spring roughly 40% of employees worked from home” (Moody, 2020). Then came 
November, which saw a surge of hospitalisations, deaths and infections in Sweden. The 
death rate remained lower than Spain and Britain but 10 times higher than Norway 
and 5 times that of Denmark. On November 25, 6,066 new cases and 10 deaths were 
recorded; November 26, 5,464 cases and 3 new deaths.1 Opponents of the Swedish 
model viewed these figures as a failure. Eric Orlowski and David Goldsmith are 
particularly pointed on the issue of the failure of herd immunity. The authors do, 
however, concede that more time is needed to assess the impacts of the respective 
policies. Despite making “critical remarks, there is neither justification for 
schadenfreude, nor for Swedes to feel unduly sheepish about their folkvett” (Orlowski 
& Goldsmith, 2020, p. 297). 
Epidemiological dissent 
The Swedish model laid the grounds for an epidemiological battle both within Sweden 
and outside the country. An April 2020 petition featuring over 2,000 doctors, scientists 
and academics, including figures such as Nobel Foundation chairman, Prof. Carl-
Henrik Heldin, called for more aggressive measures. “It is risky to leave it to people to 
decide what to do without any restrictions,” opined Joacim Rocklöv, an epidemiologist 
based at Umeå University. “As can be seen from other countries this is a serious 
disease, and Sweden is no different than other countries” (Pancevski, 2020). Virologist 
Cecelia Söderberg-Nauclér of the Karolinska Institute wondered, “No one has tried this 
route, so why should we test it first in Sweden, without informed consent?” (Reuters, 
April 4). Söderberg-Nauclér has not held back in her views, claiming that the 
government has committed grave errors in responding to a pandemic. “We’re not 
testing enough, we’re not tracking, we’re not isolating enough – we have let the virus 
loose” (Robertson, 2020). In so doing, Sweden, she argued, had been placed on the 
path to catastrophe. To avoid a lockdown, a mass-testing approach as adopted by South 
Korea would have to be adopted.  
 
1 The evolving figures are available at Folkhälsomyndigheten, Antal fal av covid-19 i Sverige, 
https://experience.arcgis.com/experience/09f821667ce64bf7be6f9f87457ed9aa.  
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On April 14, 22 Swedish researchers submitted another open letter of concern to the 
Dagens Nyheter taking issue with the Public Health Agency’s approach, and urging 
government intervention with “swift and radical measures” along the lines undertaken 
by the country’s neighbours. “In Sweden, there are now ten times more people dying 
than in neighbouring Finland where coffee shops and restaurants are closed.” Other 
comparisons were also cited, with a focus on the last three days before the Easter 
vacation. Between April 7 and 9, 2020, “10.2 people per million inhabitants died of 
COVID-19 each day in Sweden.” For the same number in Italy, it was 9.7; in Denmark, 
2.9; Norway, 2.0 and Finland 0.9 (Dagens Nyhetter, 2020).  
The effort failed to have an effect on the standing of either Tengell’s policy or himself. 
Tegnell maintained that the figures cited by his critics were marred by “a number of 
fundamental errors”. Country comparisons, he argued, were always plagued by risky 
and false assumptions. “The death figures they quote are incorrect, they do not match 
the Swedish death figures” (Svt Nyheter, 2020a). For Tegnell, this seemed as much a 
battle against the novel coronavirus as a battle of models and changing circumstances 
that might be specifically relevant to Sweden’ singular circumstances. COVID-19 
prediction models, for instance, initially relied on the examples in China and Italy, 
building upon data gathered from previous Ebola outbreaks, SARS and MERS. Other 
factors affecting the models involve considerations of demography and evidence of 
community transmission, the latter being initially unclear in Sweden. An inescapable 
fact is that Sweden has one major metropolitan area; any accurate modelling would 
require material specific to that. Ways of interaction between generations would also 
have to be considered. In Sweden, less intergenerational contact would lessen the risk 
to the elderly. More than half of Sweden’s households consist of one person, another 
telling factor (Savage, 2020). 
Despite Tegnell’s confidence, dissent from the Swedish model in the country persisted. 
Kelly Bjorklund, a human rights and public policy advocate, and Andrew Ewing, 
professor of molecular biology and chemistry at the University of Gothenburg, have 
been repeatedly scathing in their review of the Swedish model. Writing in October 
2020, the authors took issue with the refusal of the government to implement “early 
and strong measures to safeguard the population”. Despite the issue of such a policy 
being “hotly debated” in Sweden, the authors were confident that it would “result in a 
net failure in terms of death and suffering.” Figures, as they stood on October 13, noted 
a per capita death rate of 58.4 per 100,000, making it the twelfth highest in the world 
(excluding Andorra and San Marino) (Bjorklund & Ewing, 2020). 
A study published by the Journal of the American Medical Association that same 
month was also far from encouraging. The study, authored by Alyssa Bilinski and 
Ezekiel Emanuel, was seen by Bjorklund and Ewing as significant for illustrating 
similarities between the US and Swedish responses, along with their failings. They 
preferred the policy models of Denmark, Finland, Norway, South Korea, Japan and 
Taiwan, where early lockdowns and/or extensive testing and tracing regimes were 
deployed, “saved lives and limited damage to their economies” (Bjorklund & Ewing, 
2020). Reference is also made to a study on Stockholm’s wastewater published on 
October 5 challenging the proposition that increased average daily cases of 173% from 
September 2-8 to Sept. 30-Oct.6, with the number being 405% for Stockholm over that 





Another public intervention was made on November 13, 2020 in the daily Aftonbaldet, 
involving a plea by 27 Swedish scientists and doctors that the PHA’s advice be 
overridden by political fiat. Tegnell’s firm response: “No, we will keep to this path. This 
is how we work in Sweden. We have big understanding for this and a huge adherence 
to the rules” (Ahlander, 2020). 
Coming to the close of November, the state epidemiologist had to concede that the 
spread of infection had assumed the form of a second wave, contrary to its report to 
the government on September 1, which claimed that, “The most likely development in 
the spread of COVID-19 in Sweden over the next year is a relatively low general spread 
combined with local outbreaks” (Svennson, 2020). In an interview with Aftonbladet, 
the country’s chief epidemiologist lamented the absence of extensive data on the 
pandemic in sharp contrast to the extensive material weather forecasters could draw 
upon. The best that the health authorities could do was deal with scenarios (Svennson, 
2020). 
Tegnell and controversy 
The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn out the controversies of pandemic governance. 
How broad is the role given to the state health officer? In Sweden, discretion is vast, 
and institutional trust in the position clear. Politicians defer to such expertise. But 
doing so leaves one at the mercy of state medical and epidemiological opinion, and any 
peculiarities that might characterise it. Some literature even argues that Tegnell’s role 
has moved beyond that of being a mere public health decision maker to being that of a 
politician (Andersson & Aylott, 2020). 
Despite having a large, possibly even majority, following, Tegnell’s own approach has 
been marred by controversy. Among some members of the Swedish epidemiological 
community he is regarded as dogmatic and obstinate. He has made a set of 
misjudgements on aged care, levels of immunity (in Stockholm) and the possible 
severity of the earlier European lockdowns. In September, his credibility took a 
bruising when he linked the country’s death toll to the standard, seasonal flu season 
rather than SARS-CoV-2. His reasoning was based on a discredited YouTube video by 
an anti-lockdown, diet faddist from Ireland (Orange, 2020a).  
Flashpoints of disagreement also arose regarding various non-pharmacological 
measures. Tegnell has advocated openly against the wearing of face masks in curbing 
viral spread. According to Tegnell, “Face masks are an easy solution, and I’m deeply 
distrustful of easy solutions to complex problems” (Milne, 2020). He has been careful 
to avoid deep engagement with the extant literature on mask efficacy. “It’s fascinating 
how few studies there are on this,” he told Reuters in mid-November. “And if you look 
at the countries with … strict rules for wearing masks, it’s difficult to see that they have 
fared well” (Ahlander, 2020).  
Tegnell’s anti-mask concerns were expressed on April 5, 2020 in an email to Mike 
Catchpole, chief scientist at the European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention, 
claiming to be “worried about the statement ECDC has been preparing about masks.” 
To encourage the wearing of facemasks would suggest “that the spread is airborne 
which would seriously harm further communication and trust among the population 
and health care workers” (Bjorklund & Ewing, 2020). The ECDC was not moved by 
Tegnell’s concerns, recommending the use of face masks in public which “may serve as 
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a means of source control to reduce the spread of the infection in the community by 
minimising the excretion of respiratory droplets from infected individuals who have 
not yet developed symptoms or who remain asymptomatic” (European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control, 2020). In the event of supply problems, the use of 
non-medical masks made of substitutes such as textiles might be considered, given the 
need to prioritise medical face masks for health professionals. While taking longer to 
shift its view on the use of masks, the World Health Organization also revised its stance 
in June 2020 to encourage the use of masks (Ellis, 2020). 
The firm line against the wearing of masks by the public health authorities became a 
subject of interest in an October exchange between health officials and the King and 
Queen of Sweden on their visit to Karolinska University Hospital. Queen Silvia was 
perplexed. “I think many want to know why we are not recommended to wear them 
because there are demands on them in so many countries,” she suggested. The doctors 
present put forth the official Swedish position that masks could increase the risk of 
infection, despite the intention of stemming transmission. “I do not think it seems that 
anyone can explain so that you actually understand,” came the response from the King, 
Carl XVI Gustaf (Mattsson, 2020). 
The King received further clarification from Tegnell himself. Sweden’s most prominent 
public health officer impressed upon the monarch that it was more important to focus 
on physical distancing. Evaluating face protections in proximity to individuals was 
difficult, given an absence of decent studies on the subject. Several countries with “a 
very large spread of infection have … legislation on oral hygiene for long periods. So it 
is quite obvious that the masks are not going to save us from the pandemic” (Mattsson, 
2020). In making such a claim, Tegnell had confined existing literature on the subject 
to the margins. Such efforts did not convince the King, who did not shy away in his 
annual Christmas address in admitting that the Swedish government had failed in its 
pandemic policies (Svt Nyheter, 2020b). 
The Swedish model’s appeal 
The appeal of the Swedish model has been evident through Europe and beyond, 
notably in circles emphasising the consequences of severe lockdowns (loss of freedom 
of movement; economic harm; the health outcomes of coerced isolation). Indeed, 
Tegnell has been transformed, for many Swedes, into something unthinkable for the 
public health experts in other countries. In Sweden, T-shirts featuring Tegnell as a 
medieval liberator or modern action figure are available for purchase; pages of support 
and admiration abound on Facebook (Losttorpedo, 2020). Tegnell’s point, throughout, 
is that his approach is less radical than the shock caused by global lockdown formulas 
responsible for the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.  
Sympathy for Tegnell’s model could be found amongst certain European 
epidemiologists who agreed with the proposition that the lockdown was merely a 
postponement of the inevitable resurgence of infections. In the initial stages, Britain’s 
chief scientific advisor Sir Patrick Vallance had much praise for the approach, having 
made similar suggestions to UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson during the “herd 
immunity” phase of discussions (Pancevski, 2020). In Norway, epidemiologist Eiliv 
Lund accused his counterparts of simply “pushing the problem out in front of us”. The 
Swedish approach had the merits of ensuring a higher infection rate “and thus a higher 





infection formula, suggesting that the number of immune Swedes might be triple those 
of Danes. This would mean that Sweden “will be in a better situation if there’s a new 
wave” (Orange, 2020b). It was also seductive to certain politicians mindful of economic 
priorities. Finland’s Osmo Soininvaara, a former minister and member of the Helsinki 
City Council, saw more merit in Tegnell’s approach than his colleagues. In his view, 
“once the coronavirus crisis is over, the number of deaths in Sweden and Finland [will 
be] the same. The difference is that in Sweden the death toll [will have been] reached 
faster. And our economy is in ruins, but the Swedish one will be the strongest in 
Europe” (Vanttinen, 2020). 
Former prime ministers such as Australia’s Tony Abbott, who looked with alarm at the 
Stage 4 lockdown measures being practised in the city of Melbourne after a second 
COVID-19 surge at the end of June 2020, were also convinced. In a speech to the 
conservative London-based Policy Exchange think tank in September 2020, Abbott 
argued that governments in general, with the exception of Sweden, had approached 
the coronavirus “like trauma doctors; instead of thinking like health economists, 
trained to pose the uncomfortable questions about a level of deaths we might have to 
live with”. The Victorian government, he argued, had put 5.5 million Melburnians “into 
virtual house arrest, under night-time curfew, and banned at other times from leaving 
home for more than an hour a day, or from travelling more than five kilometres.” Such 
lockdowns might reduce instances of disease but not eliminate it: “the result is not just 
a stop-start economy, but a stop-start life” (Abbott, 2020). Abbott suggested a two-fold 
approach: stressing voluntary decisions made by citizens on how best they manage 
pandemic risk (the Swedish model), and the necessary exposure to health risks akin to 
the survival of the fittest. Vulnerability becomes part of a calculus, measured against a 
range of variables. Australian lockdown efforts to prevent what were predicted to be 
150,000 deaths were, suggested Abbott, insensibly generous to the elderly. “If the 
average age of those who would have died is 80, even with roughly 10 years of expected 
life left, that’s still $200,000 per quality life year – or substantially beyond what 
governments are usually prepared to pay for life-saving drugs” (Abbott, 2020). 
With a surge in coronavirus cases across Europe in the autumn, many European states 
looked to Sweden and found its model of approaching coronavirus desirable. But praise 
came more in a whisper than a shout; the Swedish policy has been adopted stealthily 
even as it is being publicly condemned for its inhumanity. As Antoine Flahault, director 
of the Institute of Global Health in Geneva puts it, European countries “are more or 
less following the Swedish model, combined with testing, tracing, and quarantine 
procedures the Germans have introduced, but none will admit it” (Erdbrink, 2020b). 
In November, Tegnell also suggested that Europe and Sweden were essentially 
converging in their pandemic strategies. “Most countries are trying to do it a bit more 
like we have done in Sweden.” He also admitted that Sweden had learned much from 
others, “like doing targeted recommendations for different regions” (Ahlander, 2020). 
With the re-introduction of lockdowns across countries in Europe, this is an 
observation that requires some circumspection. 
Concluding lessons 
In admitting that the Swedish coronavirus policy had been a failure, Prime Minister 
Löfven suggested a longer view. Only “when we are through the pandemic” could “real 
conclusions be drawn” (BBC News, 2020). That said, the debate over whether a 
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Swedish model of pandemic response is adequate or not has revealed a few, sharp 
points of contention. 
While lockdowns have been firmly eschewed in the Tegnell approach, Sweden’s 
parliament has found itself imposing stricter rules that have come close to mirroring 
the strategies of its European neighbours. This suggests, on the face of it, that Tengell’s 
previously unchallenged expertise has fallen out of favour. It also suggests that citizens 
have not been as compliant with the PHA’s recommendations as first assumed. In late 
September 2020, Stockholm’s health chief issued a warning that “far too many have 
stopped following the Swedish Public Health Agency’s recommendations” (Orange, 
2020a). On January 10, 2021, a new pandemic law came into effect allowing the 
government to “introduce special restrictions for both certain activities and places” 
(Regeringskansliet, 2020). Such measures include limiting the numbers at gatherings 
at such venues as beaches and parks, and the closure of restaurants, shops, or public 
transport. This is not to say that the authorities would, in fact, exercise such powers, 
though a legal limit on the number of people permitted in shops and sports facilities 
(one per 10 square metres) has been imposed (The Local, 2021). The idea of Swedish 
exceptionalism in public health responses to the pandemic has been challenged, 
though not totally abandoned.  
Tegnell’s point about each state being singular in terms of assessing infection and 
response remains a valid one. Models of infection rates between states vary and are not 
necessarily commensurate to each other. Given correlations between COVID-19 
mortality and age, specific consideration would have to be made to the country’s 
specific demographics. Geography and population density would also be significant, 
making a comparison using an island continent like Australia to nations bordered by 
other states flawed. Those with less population density (such as Norway) could not be 
accurately paired against the United States (Juhrs, 2020). Most problematic of all is 
the central assumption of herd immunity in this model of public health response. Such 
an approach is both scientifically uncertain and ethically suspect in privileging the 
fittest. The hope in doing so is that the vulnerable will be eventually protected by 
citizens with sufficient anti-bodies. Such a policy did not help the elderly and those 
with comorbidities in the care sector. Tegnell, along with other public health officials, 
has privately endorsed a herd immunity program but publicly rejected it.  
Until successful mass inoculation takes place, the Swedish model, however 
controversial, will remain significant. Countries keen on minimising disruptions to 
economic growth, schooling and civic, social and sporting activities will see merit in it. 
The concern, as ever, is to identify the most appropriate form of managing pandemic 
risk in balancing the harms caused to society through imposing, or not, as the case may 
be, lockdowns while still undertaking other less intrusive forms of health surveillance 
and control. 
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